Sangeetha Pillai

Since 2015, Australia has had controversial citizenship-stripping laws as a part of its national security toolkit. These laws apply to dual citizens deemed to have repudiated their allegiance to Australia by virtue of their activities, and were first introduced in response to an increase in citizens travelling overseas to serve as ‘foreign fighters’ for organisations like Islamic State. In the recent decision of Alexander v Minister for Home Affairs [2022], the High Court found a provision of these laws, s 36B of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007, to be invalid in its entirety by a 6:1 majority (Steward J dissenting). For many, this was not an unexpected outcome: since the earliest days of Australia’s citizenship-stripping laws, multiple experts have warned that there was a likelihood that legislating for conduct-based denationalisation without conviction carried a serious risk of constitutional invalidity. This post unpacks key aspects of this decision. It focuses on the lines of agreement and disagreement amongst members of the Court with respect to the two issues that attracted the most consideration: whether s 36B infringed the separation of judicial power, and whether it fell within the scope of the naturalization and aliens power in s 51(xix) of the Constitution.

Helen Irving

Alexander v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 19 (Alexander), handed down by the High Court on 8 June this year, involved a challenge to section 36B of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (as amended in 2020) (the Citizenship Act), which purported to empower the Minister to strip citizenship from an Australian dual national who, ‘by their conduct, demonstrates that the person has repudiated their allegiance to Australia’ and if the Minister is satisfied that ‘it would be contrary to the public interest for the person to remain an Australian citizen.’ The revocation of citizenship, the Court concluded, was punitive. Punishment for unlawful conduct, as it held in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1992], is a judicial function, made exclusive to the federal courts under Chapter III of the Constitution. Citizenship revocation, imposed by the executive, therefore breaches the constitutional separation of powers. Section 36B was accordingly invalid, and Mr Alexander, an Australian-Turkish dual national whose citizenship had been revoked after he travelled to Syria (and following an adverse ASIO report), remained an Australian citizen.

Elisa Arcioni & Rayner Thwaits

The Chetcuti decision of 12 August 2021 is the High Court’s latest attempt to delineate a concept of constitutional membership. Here membership is understood as ‘non-alienage’; in practical terms, immunity to deportation. The question was whether Mr Chetcuti, a British subject who arrived in Australia before the advent of …