Sebastian Long

In March 2022, the Labor Party defeated the Liberal government in the South Australian election. Amongst the promises campaigned on by the victorious new Premier, the Hon Peter Malinauskas MP, was a commitment to ban political donations. It would be over two years before any such plan was announced, with the Attorney-General, the Hon Kyam Maher MLC, remarking in August 2022 that ‘[t]here are constitutional issues we need to look at when we do the drafting to make sure we overcome’. But on 12 June 2024, the Premier released a draft of the Electoral (Accountability and Integrity) Amendment Bill 2024 (Draft Bill or DB), with his government’s intention clear: ‘We want money out of politics’. At the time of writing, public consultation on the Bill has ended and we await its results.

Samuel Naylor

On 19 December 2023, Abdul Nacer Benbrika was released from custody after being detained for the best part of 20 years. He was released after Hollingworth J of the Victorian Supreme Court made orders replacing a continuing detention order (CDO) with an extended supervision order (ESO) pursuant to div 105A within Pt 5.3 of the Criminal Code (Cth) (Code). Division 105A is a Commonwealth legislative scheme of ‘post-sentence orders’ (PSOs) whose object is:

… to protect the community from serious Part 5.3 offences by providing that terrorist offenders who pose an unacceptable risk of committing such offences are subject to [a CDO or ESO].

Theunis Roux

There have been two significant developments in comparative constitutional studies over the last decade. First, the rise of authoritarian populism in Europe and the Americas has produced an outpouring of literature on the causes of this phenomenon and what can be done to protect constitutional democracies against it. Second, after a long and mysterious delay, the Global South critique has finally arrived in the field – hauling it kicking and screaming into, not quite the twenty-first century, rather something more like the 1980s in the humanities after Edward Said’s intervention – with a lot of ground still to make up.

Ben Schonthal

I fear this piece will be both less and more than what is asked for.

It will be less in that I do not consider myself an expert on Global South constitutionalism, but only an observer of one slice of it: the constitutional systems of South and Southeast Asia. And my true expertise is even narrower than that. My research explores what happens when national constitutions confront another major source of normativity in nation-states: the one that Hirschl and Shachar have called the ‘rival’ to constitutional law, namely religion.

My comments may be more than what’s asked for in that I tend to take a wider view of comparative constitutional law than is typical at public law conferences. I am a social scientist who writes about people and topics that don’t always find their way onto the pages of the International Journal of Constitutional Law. Yes, I consider the work of judges, lawmakers and national constitutions. But I also think about Buddhist monks, protest leaders and firewalkers. For me, they are also constitutional actors—or so I hope to persuade you.

So I offer these comments with humility.

Lael K Weis

Like the other contributors to this series, I had the privilege of travelling to Darwin to attend the High Court hearings for Commonwealth v Yunupingu (D5/2023) on August 7th, 8th and 9th. This post offers a set of reflections based on attending those hearings.  My focus is on the second ground of the appeal: namely, whether native title rights fall outside the scope of s 51(xxxi) because they are ‘inherently defeasible’.  This issue consumed most of the parties’ time and attention in argument over these three days, and my instinct is that the appeal is likely to be determined on this basis. 

Sean Brennan

For more than 40 years, cases initiated by Aboriginal people have tested the interpretation of key constitutional provisions in Australia’s highest court. Since Mabo v Queensland (No 2), the High Court of Australia has also been instrumental in defining and confining possibilities for what First Nations groups might achieve through the vehicle of native title. That has included ten test cases on extinguishment law, the Yorta Yorta decision that set a high legal bar for proving continuity of connection, and the Timber Creek case about statutory rights to compensation for the extinguishment of native title.

Another such moment of reckoning has arrived for First Nations people, and for the High Court in the development of native title law and its interpretation of the Constitution.

On 9 August, the High Court sitting in Darwin reserved judgment on the answer to three questions of law posed on appeal in Commonwealth v Yunupingu. This blog post will explore what the litigation is about, how the parties argued their position in Darwin and why the case is significant.

Lucinda O'Brien and Vivien Chen

The Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme found that the scheme was ‘disastrous’, a ‘crude and cruel mechanism’ that systematically harassed and ‘traumatised’ many thousands of social security recipients. Yet consumer advocates assert that lessons from Robodebt have not been learnt and several public agencies, including the agency responsible for social security, continue to use inappropriate methods to recover debts. Our new research, conducted with colleagues at Melbourne Law School, highlights significant and enduring deficiencies in the legal frameworks concerning debt collection by government agencies. We propose reforms to improve the debt collection practices of public agencies and reduce the risk that government debt collection will cause further serious and unjustifiable harm.

Lisa Burton Crawford

Recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) seem to have thrown the administrative state into crisis. A suite of recent cases have limited executive power in important ways—for example, by requiring executive action to be authorised by far more detailed legislation than has previously been required, or preventing executive agencies from performing certain functions that they have been allowed to in the past. These include the momentous decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo, 603 US ___ (2024) — in which the SCOTUS effectively overturned the doctrine of Chevron deference.

Why should Australian public lawyers be interested in these developments? What light do they cast on our own legal system, and its particular strengths and pathologies? This post explores these issues, beginning with the complex legislative framework that sustains administrative government here.

Harry Sanderson

A majority of the United States Supreme Court in June abolished Chevron deference—a doctrine which had been a cornerstone of US administrative law for 40 years. The decision was long-anticipated, but is likely to be divisive. This post explains the Court’s reasoning in Loper Bright Enterprises v Raimondo, 603 US ___ (2024) and some of its possible implications for US and Australian administrative law.

Riley O’Keeffe

Maintaining integrity within the public sector is an integral component of responsible and good government. Theories of deviance suggest that as long as there are rules, there will be rule-breakers. Without proper or robust accountability mechanisms, public trust in government institutions would decline. Serious wrongdoing within the public sector, such as corruption, fraud or maladministration, is not within the public interest. Therefore, the inclination of public sector employees to speak up against serious wrongdoing is of vital importance in maintaining integrity within the public sector. The protections available for public sector whistleblowers must be strong enough to protect them from any possible detriment that may follow as a result of speaking up.

Public sector whistleblowing, also referred to as making a Public Interest Disclosure (‘PID’), is the action of identifying and reporting serious wrongdoing that affects the public sector. The Public Interest Disclosures Act 2022 (NSW) (‘new PID Act’) is one tool that can be used to ensure accountability and integrity are maintained within the public sector.

Benjamin B Saunders

I am grateful to Professor James Stellios and Leslie Gonye for their interaction with my book – from two very different perspectives.

The book is an expansion and development of my PhD research, which was a historical examination of the views of the framers of the Constitution regarding responsible government, completed in 2017. At the time, Professor Stellios encouraged me to develop further some aspects of my work, including giving further examination to the concepts of ‘popular sovereignty’ and the ‘sovereignty’ of the people, and also reflecting further on the doctrinal implications of my thesis.

Leslie Gonye

I commend Ben Saunders on his book Responsible Government and the Australian Constitution. He has produced an accessible work that diligently examines and threads together a vast volume of material to argue the importance of historic context in understanding the Constitution regarding responsible government. This is key, as the provisions in the Constitution that concern the executive are relatively few and as responsible government is fundamentally political, there is plenty of scope for principles to evolve for governments to operate for the sovereign people of Australia to govern themselves in the manner they deem best (Saunders, p 207).

James Stellios

In this comment I offer observations on Associate Professor Saunders’ book, Responsible Government and the Australian Constitution (Hart, 2023) (Saunders), focusing primarily on the doctrinal implications of the book’s thesis. I will start by reflecting on the institutions of ‘representative and responsible’ government. While often presented as a composite expression, the institutions are distinct in principle, and that distinctiveness might have important implications for the role of judicial review. Further complicating the place of judicial review within the constitutional system is the tension created by the combination of political and legal constitutionalism, as each conception of constitutionalism contemplates a different means for controlling government power. Finally, I briefly reflect on the doctrinal implications of these constitutional features.

Michael Legg and Felicity Bell

At the end of 2023 the Australian public were captivated by the defamation case of Bruce Lehrmann v Network Ten Pty Limited (Lehrmann v Network Ten). Mr Lehrmann alleged that he had been defamed by the reporting of an interview with former parliamentary staffer Brittany Higgins, who alleged that she had been raped at Parliament House in the early hours of 23 March 2019. Mr Lehrmann was not named but it was alleged that the reporting indicated that he was the perpetrator. Judgment was handed down in April 2024. Justice Lee of the Federal Court found, on the balance of probabilities, Mr Lehrmann raped Ms Higgins at Parliament House in 2019 and Mr Lehrmann’s claim failed (Lehrmann v Network Ten Pty Limited (Trial Judgment) [2024] FCA 369 (Lehrmann (Trial Judgment))).

Attention then switched to the question of costs. While the media has focused on the sheer level of costs — reporting that some of the many counsel involved in the proceedings charge upward of $8000 per day — the Lehrmann case illustrates the dual costs risks of litigating civil matters in Australia. These are that you may have to pay both your own lawyers, and the legal costs of your opponent/s if you are unsuccessful.

William Partlett

In February 2024, the High Court held in AB v IBAC [2024] HCA 10 that individuals facing an ‘adverse’ finding in a report issued by Victoria’s anti-corruption commission, the Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission (‘IBAC’), must be given broad access to the evidentiary material that justified that finding. In response, commentators have worried that this kind of ruling would damage the public interest, slowing down the release of anti-corruption reports while individuals litigate their ability to adequately respond to allegations.

Janina Boughey

Anyone who has worked in a government department for more than a brief period knows how much ministers differ in their interest in their portfolio, diligence, and competence. The best ones (from a departmental staffer’s perspective, at least) are efficient, yet seem to be across all of the important details, which they might demonstrate by asking pointed questions which raise issues the department may not have considered. Others are quick, but one gets a sense that they might not have really engaged with issues in their portfolio—that they are simply doing a ‘tick and flick’. They might, for instance, require all briefings to be less than a page long which, on complex policy issues, means leaving out important details and nuances. Then there are ministers who pore laboriously over every detail of even the most mundane, routine decisions.

Amy Tan

In July 2022, the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a landmark resolution to recognise the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment by a vote of 161 in favour, 0 against and 8 abstentions. Whilst Australia voted in favour of the resolution, the Federal Government has thus far not indicated any desire to legislate this domestically.

In March 2023, the Australian Human Rights Commission ('the AHRC') launched a Position Paper outlining a proposed federal Human Rights Act. Notably, amid the 28 rights outlined was the right to a healthy environment. This Position Paper has since formed the basis of an inquiry into a Human Rights Framework for Australia by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (‘the PJCHR’), with the final report due in early 2024. This revived push is an exciting development which has come after a decades-long call from the legal and general community alike for more comprehensive statutory protection of human rights.

Douglas McDonald-Norman

In order to determine whether a decision is affected by jurisdictional error, a court must ask two questions. Has an error occurred, in breach of the statutory conferral of power to make that decision? And, if so, was that error material to the decision-maker’s ultimate exercise of power? For an error to be material, an applicant for review must establish that there is a realistic possibility that, if not for the error, the decision-maker’s ultimate exercise of power could have been different.

Jerry Leung, Maxen Williams, and Kevin Zou

Last month, it was reported that the Victorian Director of Public Prosecutions, Kerri Judd KC, had made complaints to the Judicial Commission of Victoria about two judges: Justice Lasry of the Supreme Court of Victoria, and Judge Chettle of the County Court of Victoria. In the complaint against Lasry J, the Solicitor for Public Prosecutions, Abbey Hogan, alleged that his Honour’s criticisms of the VDPP in DPP v Tuteru had ‘the real tendency to diminish [(1)] public confidence in the administration of justice in Victoria [and (2)] the confidence of litigants and the public in general in his Honour’s integrity and impartiality’. Shortly after being made aware of the complaint, Lasry J in open court announced that he would resign even though he ‘utterly rejected’ the allegations made against him.

In this post, we do not make any comment on the merits of the complaints against Lasry J and Judge Chettle. Rather, taking a step back from the Victorian saga, we argue that there are strong normative and legal reasons as to why the executive should exercise restraint before making a formal complaint against a judge. We begin by explaining why formal complaints made by the executive against the judiciary should be the exception rather than the norm. This is followed by an illustration of the other mechanisms available for securing judicial accountability that better uphold a culture of comity between the executive and the judiciary

Chris Honnery

In Ismail v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 2, a five-judge bench of the High Court sitting in its original jurisdiction considered the construction, validity, and operation of Direction 90, a written direction given by the Minister to guide decision‑makers in exercising powers under s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

This post focuses on two of the aspects of the High Court’s unanimous judgment that will have broader ramifications for decisions to refuse or cancel visas on character grounds.